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We live in a three-dimensional (3D) spatial world; however, our retinas receive a pair of
2D projections of the 3D environment. By using multiple cues, such as disparity, motion
parallax, perspective, our brains can construct 3D representations of the world from the
2D projections on our retinas. These 3D representations underlie our 3D perceptions of
the world and are mapped into our motor systems to generate accurate sensorimotor
behaviors. Three-dimensional perceptual and sensorimotor capabilities emerge during
development: the physiology of the growing baby changes hence necessitating an
ongoing re-adaptation of the mapping between 3D sensory representations and the
motor coordinates. This adaptation continues in adulthood and is quite general to
successfully deal with joint-space changes (longer arms due to growth), skull and eye
size changes (and still being able of accurate eye movements), etc. A fundamental
question is whether our brains are inherently limited to 3D representations of the
environment because we are living in a 3D world, or alternatively, our brains may have
the inherent capability and plasticity of representing arbitrary dimensions; however, 3D
representations emerge from the fact that our development and learning take place in
a 3D world. Here, we review research related to inherent capabilities and limitations
of brain plasticity in terms of its spatial representations and discuss whether with
appropriate training, humans can build perceptual and sensorimotor representations
of spatial 4D environments, and how the presence or lack of ability of a solid and direct
4D representation can reveal underlying neural representations of space.
Keywords: hypercube, brain plasticity, sensorimotor, four-dimensional, neural representations, learning, brain
development
INTRODUCTION
Species operate in space and their behavioral success depends on how well they process, represent,
store, and recall spatial information. In addition to being a fundamental aspect of sensorimotor
behavior, the concept of space plays an important role in our understanding of higher cognitive
functions. Indeed, the concept of space has been central to the thinking of many philosophers
such as Plato, AlHazen, Descartes, Hume, and Kant to name a few (Huggett, 1999). Questions
such as whether space is a priori or learned, whether it is objective or subjective have been
debated. The concepts of space and time and their relationship shape theories in modern physics.
Given this background, it goes without saying that the concept of space also plays a major
role in psychology and neuroscience. For example, based on children’s spatial reorientation and
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navigation behavior, Spelke et al. (2011) concluded that two
systems of human core knowledge (i.e., ancient, innate, and
universal systems) reflect the primary properties of Euclidian
plane geometry. She suggested that these systems lack the
power of abstract generalization; however, language and symbolic
representations allow children to combine productively their
core knowledge to attain abstract thoughts that form the
foundations of abstract mathematical geometry (Spelke et al.,
2011). According to the Piagetian theory, higher cognitive
functions are built upon sensorimotor schema, which represent
the operation of sensory and motor systems in space and
time (Piaget, 1936, 1950). The progression from sensorimotor
stage to formal operational stage takes place as ego-centric
“subjective” sensorimotor representations, i.e., representations
whose reference frames are based on the subject, such
as head-centered representations, become coordinated across
initially independent sensory spaces (e.g., ego-centric visual
space, ego-centric tactile space) to give rise to exo-centric
(i.e., reference-frames) based outside of the subject “objective”
representations (e.g., object-centered representations) (Piaget,
1936, 1950). Neurophysiological studies revealed multiple
representations of space in various brain areas, including ego-
centric (Gross and Graziano, 1995; Grieves and Jeffery, 2017)
and exo-centric representations (Olson, 2003). Notwithstanding
specific theoretical stances and underlying neurophysiological
correlates, these approaches focus on three-dimensional (3D)
or two-dimensional (2D) representations simply because our
environment is 3D and its projections are 2D. Our visual
system receives on our retinas a pair of 2D projections
of a 3D environment. By using multiple cues, such as
disparity, motion parallax, perspective, and shading, our brains
can construct 3D representations of the world from its 2D
projections on our retinas.
A natural question that arises is, if our brains can construct
3D representations from the 2D projections (Figure 1A), can it
also construct 4D spatial representations from 2D projections
that represent a spatially 4D world (Figure 1B)? This question
touches a fundamental theme regarding the limits of plasticity
in the brain: Are our brains hard-wired to be limited to
FIGURE 1 | Two-dimensional projections of a 3D and a 4D object. It is easy
and accessible for us to have a solid 3D impression of (A) as a cube, however,
looking at (B) doesn’t pop a solid 4D impression of a hypercube. Panels (A,B)
are from: http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:3-cube column graph.svg and
http://commonswikimedia.org/wiki/File:4-cubecolumngraph.svg, respectively,
and have been released into the public domain by their author Geoff Richards
(Qef).
3D representations because it evolved and developed in 3D
worlds, or do they have inherent plasticity to represent arbitrary
dimensions? The neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of the
brain indicate high-dimensional internal representations: For
example, the representation for an object not only includes
three-dimensional space but also other feature dimensions like
brightness, hue, texture, curvature, etc. However, whether these
internal high-dimensional representations can be translated to
higher dimensions for the external space remains unanswered.
Support for brain plasticity in spatial representations comes
from inherent plasticity that allows to cope for natural
changes that occur, in particular, during the developmental
period where three-dimensional perceptual and sensorimotor
capabilities emerge. A fundamental aspect of development is that
the physiology of the growing baby changes hence necessitating
an ongoing re-adaptation of the 3D representations and the
mapping between 3D sensory representations and the motor
coordinates. This adaptation continues in adulthood. But is
this adaptation general to deal with drastic changes such as
going from 3D to 4D? Hence, a fundamental question is
whether our brains are inherently limited to 3D representations
of the environment because we are living in a 3D world.
Alternatively, our brains may have the inherent capability of
representing arbitrary dimensions; however, 3D representations
emerge from the fact that our development and learning take
place in a 3D world.
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE
CONCEPT
Studies exploring 4D environments focused on different aspects
of the underlying concept. For example, the titles of these
studies refer to the phenomenon under study as “4D spatial
reasoning,” “4D spatial intuition,” “4D spatial judgments.” “4D
spatial representations.” They also use different variables to
operationalize the concept. Such a diversity is expected because
our spatial competencies are multi-faceted and have different
neural correlates. We can perceive three-dimensional objects,
we can reason about three-dimensional space and objects in
abstract ways, and we can navigate in the 3D space. Although
these abilities do have some communalities, their underlying
computations and neural correlates are not identical. For
example, when we state that we perceive a 3D object, we may
be referring to the perceptions that arise from a 2D drawing
with perspective cues versus those that arise in a virtual reality
headset. Although in both cases we “perceive a 3D structure,”
the phenomenal experience from a 2D drawing vs. from virtual
reality are extremely different suggesting differences in their
neural representations.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Aflalo and Graziano (2008) studied subjects’ path-integration
ability in 4D environments to assess their “four-dimensional
spatial reasoning.” Subjects (five adults) were asked to navigate
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in a 4D maze and, upon reaching the end of the maze, to point
to the location of the starting point of the maze. The angular
difference between subjects’ response and the true direction
quantified the error in path integration. The 4D maze was
constructed by mapping the 4D stimulus on a 2D display through
projective geometry (this is called the “projection technique” of
4D stimulus generation). An additional cue was added for the
fourth dimension: The extremes of the fourth dimension’s axis
(±∞) were labeled “hot” and “cold” and hues between red and
blue were used to signal to the subject where s/he is along the
fourth dimension’s axis. Subjects were allowed to practice on
their own computer at home and spent 15 min to 1 h per day
for several weeks. They were given feedback after each trial.
During the initial trials in laboratory testing for the 4D maze,
subjects’ performance improved rapidly (ca. 20 trials; average trial
duration ranged from 45 s to 2.7 min) and remained thereafter
at a plateau level. A second improvement in performance was
observed after the plateau phase (ca. 160 trials). Aflalo and
Graziano (2008) compared their subjects’ performance to those
of two theoretical (simulated) models that were designed to solve
the puzzle by using only 3D spatial reasoning. With subjects
performing better than these models, Aflalo and Graziano (2008)
concluded that subjects were capable of 4D spatial reasoning, as
assessed by the path-integration task.
Ambinder et al. (2009) used 4D tetrahedrons and presented
subjects successive slices of the stimuli as it would happen if
the subject were to walk through the fourth dimension’s axis
(this is called the “slicing technique” of 4D stimulus generation).
Observers (four adults) judged the distance between two vertices
or the orientation of a surface plane. No feedback was given.
They found a significant positive correlation between reported
distances/orientations and the true 4D distances/orientations
(among conditions and subjects, R2 values ranged from
0.29 to 0.81). They concluded that humans can represent
and make geometrical judgments (distance and orientation)
about 4D objects.
In a follow-up study, Wang (2014a) noted that the path-
integration task used by Aflalo and Graziano (2008) can be solved
by using exclusively 3D information. There is also evidence
that navigation tasks may be based on graphs rather than
geometrical maps (Chrastil and Warren, 2014). Wang (2014a)
also pointed out that length and orientation judgments used by
Ambinder et al. (2009) are 1D and 2D geometric properties,
respectively. To eliminate these lower dimensional solutions,
she selected a 4D property, the hyper-volume of 4D objects,
as the dependent variable. To present the 4D stimuli, she used
a “rotation technique,” where the 4D object is rotated around
a selected plane. No feedback was given to the subjects (three
adults). Results showed significant correlations between reported
and actual hypervolumes (ß values ranged from 0.44 to 0.73)
and Wang concluded that humans can have 4D representations
that provide estimates of inherently 4D properties, such
as hyper-volume.
Miwa et al. (2018) designed an interactive environment
wherein a 4D hypercube was projected to a 3D space by using
perspective projection. A hypercube was centered at the origin
of the 4D space and each of the eight sides of the 4D cube was
displayed with a different color. Perspective projection makes
parallel lines converge at infinity1 and this point of convergence
is called the “vanishing point.” When the parallel lines are also
parallel to one of the axes of the coordinate system, these points
are called “principal vanishing points.” These principal vanishing
points were displayed along with the stimulus. The observer
could change her point of view of the stimulus by manipulating
principal vanishing points. This allowed the observer to actively
visualize and explore the stimulus. Before the start of the main
experiment, observers were given up to 3 h to actively visualize
and explore the stimulus. They were then tested on their ability
to navigate along checkpoints in the 4D space. These checkpoints
were chosen randomly with the constraint that three or four sides
of the hypercube are simultaneously visible from the checkpoint.
Of their 12 subjects (mean age: 20.5 years), one dropped out, three
had poor performance (measured by the proportion of correctly
visited checkpoints) and the remaining eight had successful
performance (≥ 70%). In a second experiment, they used the
so-called “color cube test,” where an N-dimensional cube is
constructed with each side having a different color. This cube is
then projected to a N – 1 dimensional space and observers are
shown N different views of the cube in the N – 1 dimensional
space. The task of the observer was to answer questions like “what
color is the side of the cube which is positioned opposite to the green
side?” To accomplish this task in 3D, observers typically mentally
rotate a 3D mental representation of the cube to understand
the relationships between different sides/colors. Of the twelve
subjects, two dropped out, three had poor performance whereas
the remaining seven had good performance (≥ 70%). Based on
these results, the authors concluded that “humans are capable of
learning 4D representations.”
While higher order visual areas are involved in 3D vision (Tsao
et al., 2003), neural responses in early visual areas are modulated
by stimulus 3D configuration (Dobbins et al., 1998). Qian and
Yazdanbakhsh (2015), suggested a neural model for interactions
between higher and lower visual areas encoding distance and
size that can be one of bases of size constancy – perceiving
an object size irrespective of its distance, as one of the lower
order spatial recognition processes. As such, if human direct 4D
percept materializes, we may reach to broader forms of visual
object constancy that signify higher order scene groupings to be
reflected by modern artists and virtual reality developers.
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS:
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE
CONCEPT
As mentioned previously, human perception, cognition, and
action are multi-faceted. When we study human perception,
cognition, and action in 3D, we introduce numerous
experimental paradigms and variables intended to capture
different aspects of brain processes and behaviors. Similarly,
studies of 4D used different approaches such as navigation
1With the exception of those lines that are parallel to the projection plane; these
lines remain parallel under perspective projection.
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performance and a variety of geometric judgments. Adaptation
experiments with inverting glasses (Stratton, 1897; Kohler,
1962) provide a good illustration why one needs to examine
different variables: In these experiments, subjects were fitted with
inverting glasses making the stimuli appear “upside down.” First,
subjects had difficulty in operating with these glasses but with
practice they became quite adept in complex behaviors, such
as riding a bicycle in city streets. However, in general, subjects
did not experience the stimulus flipping to its normal, instead
of upside-down appearance. Hence, at the perceptual level, the
system did not compensate for and correct the effect of inverting
glasses but it did so at the sensorimotor level (Harris, 1965;
Linden et al., 1999). Hence, careful definitions of dependent
and independent variables to reflect the multi-faceted aspects
of our brain processes and behaviors are important to explore
4D performance. Random dot stereograms have been used to
generate 3D phenomenal experience from 2D images without
any information other than disparity. An adaptation of this
approach for 4D percepts may help generate phenomenological
4D experience. How this 4D perception would be is difficult to
answer; however, we can extrapolate our experiences that arise
when we perceive 3D structures in random dot stereograms
or the experience in a 3D movie theater with and without
polarizing glasses.
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS:
GENERATION OF 4D STIMULI IN A 3D
WORLD
Methods for presenting four and higher dimensional stimuli
and environments have been developed (D’Zmura et al., 2000)
and a 4D maze game is available 2. As mentioned in the
review of previous work, a variety of geometric approaches have
been used: The projection, slicing, and rotation methods. Some
studies provided additional cues to enhance 4D representations.
New technologies, such as virtual and augmented reality, can
create complex representations of 4D, however, the broader
question is rather theoretical: Human retina has a 2D structure
onto which the environment needs to be projected. In the
case of a 3D environment, the optics of the eye and the
physical properties of our 3D environment dictate the use
of projective geometry to describe how the distal stimulus is
transformed into the corresponding proximal stimulus. How
can a 4D world be projected onto 2D proximal stimulus?
First, even though we cannot physically build 4D objects, we
have mathematical languages to describe and reason about
arbitrary spatial dimensions. In fact, some of the early evidence
about the possibility of 4D representations came from some
mathematicians’ phenomenal reports of 4D perceptions during
their studies of 4D spaces (Davis et al., 1995). But unlike 3D to
2D projections, where physical properties of the environment and
the physiology of the eyes determine a specific type of projection,
there is a priori no such constraint for 4D. There are infinitely
many ways of projecting a higher dimension to a lower one, and
2http://www.urticator.net/maze/
without any constraints, which one is most appropriate, remains
an open question.
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS: PRACTICE
OR NO PRACTICE, FEEDBACK OR NO
FEEDBACK
Perceptual learning is a complex process that depends on
multiple factors such as motivation, attention, feedback, and
amount of practice. Given the drastic changes it implies, learning
4D representations is likely to necessitate time for adaptation.
However, how much time this adaptation will take is not known.
Providing feedback can help accelerate this process. However,
a major issue with feedback is that subjects can, consciously or
unconsciously, discover low-level cues that can lead to successful
responses without necessarily building 4D representations. This
observation points to another fundamental problem, viz., how to
eliminate stimulus artifacts that correlate positively with the task.
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS:
ELIMINATION OF ARTIFACTS
A major problem in studying 4D is to determine whether subjects’
behavioral success can be based on cues (as mentioned above,
some studies used additional cues such as color or principal
vanishing points) and factors that are not inherently 4D. For
example, Aflalo and Graziano (2008) used two theoretical models
of path integration that were designed to solve the puzzle by using
only 3D spatial reasoning and looked for better performance
than these models to infer 4D capabilities. However, Wang
(2014a) noted that path integration can be solved algebraically
without building 4D representations. Frank (2014) and Wang
(2014b) argued whether hypervolume estimation requires 4D
representations. Selection of experimental variables and the
design of the experiments require a careful analysis of all artifacts
and alternative strategies without 4D representations in order to
conclude that indeed humans can build 4D representations.
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS:
INTER-SUBJECT VARIABILITY
Another issue that needs further investigation is inter-subject
variability, as exemplified by the discussion of Miwa et al.’s
(2018) results above. It is conceivable that, because of factors
such as attention and motivation, some subjects may take
longer or may need different training strategies to build 4D
representations. Given that even simple visual illusions are
not universally experienced (Phillips, 2019), there is also the
possibility that only a subset of humans can achieve this
competence. Subject populations in these studies were relatively
small and composed mainly of college students. It may be
also possible that humans lose their ability of building high-
dimensional spaces early in childhood as observed in various
“critical periods” in development. Hence, there is a need to
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further analyze inter-subject variability in order to be able to
generalize the results.
WHAT CAN MACHINE LEARNING TELL
US ABOUT 4D REPRESENTATIONS?
It has been shown that 3-layer neural networks are “universal
approximators,” in that they can learn arbitrary input-output
mappings with arbitrary precision (Funahashi, 1989; Hornik
et al., 1989, 1990). However, the success of these networks in
solving practical problems has been severely constrained in the
past by limited training data sets and limited computational
power to carry out the training. Recently “deep neural networks”
have shown success beyond the performance levels obtained by
traditional computer vision and pattern recognition algorithms.
In addition to rich data sets and enhanced computing power,
this success can be traced to the fact that several layers of these
networks include a priori computations (e.g., convolutions) that
are aimed to capture some of the desired output properties,
such as position invariance. By the “no-free lunch” (Wolpert,
1996) and “bias-variance” (Geman et al., 1992) theorems, it is
clear that introducing such a priori biases to networks can limit
their domain of universality while enhancing their performance
in applications in which the bias matches a desired output
property, e.g., position invariance. Hence one way to study how
4D representations can be built is through training a variety of
neural network architectures, each including different a priori
structures that reflect a priori biases, to find networks that can
and those that cannot learn 4D representations.
NEUROIMAGING TECHNIQUES
PERTINENT TO THE PRESENCE OR
ABSENCE OF SOLID 4D PERCEPTS
Decoding 4D Percepts From fMRI
Signals
As noted above, improvements in task performance in a 4D
environment alone may not be sufficient to conclude that
humans can build 4D representations due to potential artifact
by factors that are not inherently 4D. This problem persists
when one is to test 4D representations in the brain by
using neuroimaging techniques such as functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). Studies for 3D perception have
used electrophysiological techniques (Ohzawa et al., 1990;
DeAngelis et al., 1991; Tsao et al., 2003) and fMRI (Tsao et al.,
2003; Preston et al., 2008; Orban, 2011) to identify brain areas
that represent 3D information. These studies reported that 3D
information can be extracted from activations in multiple visual
areas along with the hierarchy of the visual system. In particular,
it has been shown that a particular visual area such as V3B/KO
is involved in integration of disparity and motion cues to depth
(Ban et al., 2012). More recently, the entorhinal cortex has
been shown to be involved in representation of 3D space (Kim
and Maguire, 2019). Based on these findings in studies for 3D
perception, it can be hypothesized that visual areas and the
entorhinal cortex come to be involved in representation and
integration of 4D information once human subjects acquire 4D
percept. More concretely, if activations in these areas accurately
predict subjects’ perceptual report and/or performance in 4D
visual tasks, it will strongly support that subjects actually perceive
an object in 4D space.
CONCLUSION
Perceiving higher spatial dimensions beyond 3D has been a
longstanding quest for a broad range of researchers including
but not limited to philosophers, mathematicians, psychologists,
neuroscientists, developers of virtual reality, and engineers.
A success in this endeavor will literally create a new dimension
for the human mind. It may be possible to reach not only
4 but even higher dimensions. If such an ability exists, its
training and testing pose formidable challenges. In this article,
we reviewed uncertainties pertaining to whether observers truly
learn and represent a 4D scene or rather rely on indirect lower
dimensional cues to perform a task which is within a 4D visual
space. This high-risk high-return topic has the potential to
completely transform our understanding of brain representations
and their plasticity.
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